War is a paradoxical phenomenon. The idea that a willingness to wage war can serve as a guarantee for peace has had adherents from Antiquity down to the present era; the Latin dictum si vis pacem para bellum and the observation that the post-1945 nuclear standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact directly contributed to an era of peace and prosperity in the Western world are all instances of the same paradox. In his recent War: What Is It Good For? (2014) Ian Morris posits an even stronger paradox: war itself, rather than merely a preparedness for war, has had massively benign effects for mankind. Morris claims that in spite of the horrendous immediate impact of war, in the long run "productive" warfare put a premium on cooperation and created larger and more organized societies that have dramatically reduced the risk that their members will succumb to violence, while it has vastly increased their wealth. Moreover, he claims that no other activity in history has been better at producing peaceful and prosperous societies than war.
The function of war: before Spencer Spencer was not the first to think about the social functionality or dysfunctionality of war in a progressive, stadial context. Stadial models of history were informed by an Enlightened optimism about progress, peace and science. An example is provided by Adam Ferguson (1723 -1816 and his Essay on the History of Civil Society. Ferguson, with whose work Spencer was acquainted, notes that no activity is better suited to stimulate the activity and manly virtues that benefit the internal development of a society than military conflict with its neighbours. 7 In the savage and barbarian stages of history, the need for external violence stimulated peaceful internal cooperation and hence civilization. Moreover, the need for a vigorous spirit has remained in the more "polished" societies at a later stage in history. If it has become increasingly difficult to gain this vigour in military battle, then it should be sought in a nation's internal market. 8 In Mandeville's model of private economic activity with unintended beneficial consequences, Ferguson finds a replacement for a function that had previously been fulfilled by warfare. 9 Ferguson's analysis of a development in which warfare first provided positive functionality while becoming redundant in a later stage, was continued in the nineteenth century. In this century the stadial model was often infused with biology as a paradigmatic science that was supposed to be instrumental in the development of an all-revealing "science of society". 10 Of special relevance here is Auguste Comte (1798-1857), whom Spencer started to read in 1851. Spencer would denounce Comtianism as unscientific, but Comte provided Spencer with his conception of the interaction between (social) organisms and their environment. 11 Moreover, Comte assigned a functionality to warfare in a stadial context, in which he, in his turn, was influenced by ClaudeHenri de Rouvroy, count of Saint-Simon (1760-1820). Saint-Simon sees an all-important dichotomy between the feudal or theological system and the industrial or scientific system, between the feudal class and the industrial class, and between the feudal spirit and the industrial spirit. These categories are used to draw an optimistic historical development from the feudal to the industrial stage. Although Saint-Simon condemns war in the present, he appreciates its function in the past. He notes that in feudal times warfare had a clear function and all the parts of the political body were coordinated towards that purpose. 12 The feudal system remained functional as long as war itself remained the main purpose of a nation, but as the art of war became more perfect, it came to rely more on industry, and hence it gradually became more dependent on the industrial rather than the feudal classes. As the military power of nations came to depend less on drill and more on their industrial apparatus, it became increasingly difficult to wage war without disturbing economic production; hence warfare came to exert an increasingly deleterious influence on the whole of mankind, the victors included. So ultimately the increased industrial sophistication of warfare contributed to a marginalization of its functionality. 13 Saint-Simon's dualism between war and industry can also be found in the work of his pupil Comte, who distinguishes three stages in the evolution of human knowledge: the theological stage is associated with the military life, the positive stage is associated with the industrial life, while the metaphysical stage is merely an intermediate and transitory stage. In the theological stage warfare stimulated the earliest forms of technology and it also forged social cooperation as a defence against enemy groups; conquest resulted in ever larger political unites and within these units division of labour was stimulated -but ultimately warfare would be replaced by the hegemony of a scientific mind-set, the rule of Harmony, and a Religion of Humanity. 14 
Spencer on the function of war
Wars are fought by societies, and in his massive Principles of Sociology Spencer explains that societies are evolving systems. I will return to his concept of evolution at a later stage, and start here with the most important concepts of his general systems theory. This theory was more fully developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901 Bertalanffy ( -1972 and others in the twentieth century, but had many predecessors in earlier thought, and one of the most underestimated contributions was made by Spencer. 15 He uses the term "system" or "aggregate" for a set of interacting components that form a complex whole and that are in constant interaction with surroundings that can themselves consist of one or more systems. 16 He describes his social systems in terms of structures that carry out functions. The cooperative needs of these structures stimulate the growth of a regulating system. The most urgent and thus the oldest functions of this regulating system are of a defensive and offensive nature. In addition, social systems have "sustentive" functions (economic production) and distributing functions (transport and communication). 17 Spencer observes how part of the output of a (social) system is used by this same system as new input, which results either in positive (self-reinforcing) or negative (self-correcting) feedback loops. Although he does not use these modern terms, he is very well-acquainted with the concept of a feedback system, which he uses for an analysis of countless phenomena, including warfare. 18 The result is a complex pattern of interactions between environmental factors that influence functions that influence structures, and structures that influence functions that influence environmental factors. 19 On the one hand, functional demands must have preceded structural answers, but on the other hand, structures tend to reach a stage where their own "sustention" becomes the primary thing and their function the secondary thing, so that structures can easily outlast functions. 20 Spencer not only classifies societies according to the level of the integration of their regulative, sustentive and distributing functions, but also according to the prevalence of structures that favour conflict or welfare. He distinguishes the "militant type", which favours war, and the "industrial type", which favours peace. He leaves no doubt that the contrasts between their traits "are among the most important with which Sociology has to deal". 21 Societies can have characteristics of both types, but since war formed the prime motive for cooperation amongst humans, be it for defensive or offensive motives, the first societies to appear in human history were of the militant type. 22 Military functional demands influenced the structure of societies from their very origin and have continued to do so. Initially the political regulating system was merely an extension of the military regulating system. Military heads grew into political heads, and "in proportion as militancy is chronic, the organization proper to an army becomes the organization proper to the whole society". 23 Only when civilizations became more complex did political and military organization become dissociated, but the relation between military officers who acquired civil functions and political functionaries who were imbued with a military ethos remained close. 24 Spencer notes instances of the relation between successful "militancy" and the strengthening of political control as recently as the career of Napoleon and the unification of the German Empire. 25 Spencer gives an amazingly rich and detailed analysis of the profound influence of military regimentation on the evolution of societies. The needs of warfare constituted the main motive for taxation and the resulting coercive organization was the instrument by which even more taxes could be extracted. 26 Spencer also notes the primitive identity of military institutions with institutions for administering justice, and he observes "how close is the kinship between the modes of dealing with external aggression and internal aggression". 27 Both functions were originally performed by a body formed of chief, head men and people. The history of consultative bodies is equally informed by warfare. At first these structures were nothing more than councils of war, consisting of open-air meetings of armed men that deliberated on military measures. Only subsequently were the actions of these bodies provided with a wider political scope. 28 Not only does Spencer ascribe an enormous impact to warfare, like many of his predecessors he also notes the predominantly positive character of this influence. Cooperation within a social group demanded likeness amongst its units for more effective action against members of other groups, which increased the cooperation within groups and made their members even more similar. 29 In this way internal development and external conflict had a mutually reinforcing character. Thanks to this process societies saw a decline in the aggression between their members. Strong and militarily successful empires not only brought in their wake the oppression of their members but they were also instrumental in spreading civilization in ever larger empires: "The evidence obliges us to admit that subjection to despots has been largely instrumental in advancing civilization. Induction and deduction alike prove this." 30 The evolution of political, professional and ecclesiastical institutions prompted by military demands all point in the same beneficent direction. 31 Actually, military cooperation was the chief cause of social integration in general. 32 So, institutional evolution, war, conquest and annexation all contributed to an upward spiralling process. 33 If the horrors of war were indeed capable of providing such tangibly positive results, then this provides us with a fine specimen of the strong paradox of war. Spencer was baffled by this paradox, which is not surprising, given his deeply pacifist sympathies. 34 Hence his use of the phrase "the evidence obliges us to admit", mentioned above. 35 Similarly, when he admits "that abject submission of the weak to the strong, however, unscrupulously enforced, has in some times and places been necessary", he adds: "In brief, trustworthy interpretations of social arrangements imply an almost passionless consciousness." 36 A pacifist needs clinical eyes before he is prepared to appreciate the positive effects of carnage.
Although Spencer tries to appreciate the functionality of war in dispassionate terms, he nevertheless puts a distinct and relatively early cap on the ultimate reach of the strong paradox. We have already observed his point that structures have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, long after their functions have become superfluous, or even detrimental. 37 Not all structures are liable to a process of ossification to the same degree, but military structures are especially vulnerable in this regard. 38 The regimentation and forced cooperation implied by the militant type implies a structure that strongly resists change. 39 Spencer provides an extensive anthropological and historical analysis of military functions that eventually result in rigid and unproductive customs and structures. For instance, war, which is a predominantly masculine affair, stands in the way of a greater equality of the sexes and necessitates hard physical labour by women (who have to replace their warring husbands), who consequently will be prevented from producing "more and better offspring." 40 Moreover, warfare stimulates the widespread use of obeisances, forms of address and classbadges, which all signify subjection. 41 Ecclesiastical institutions tend to strengthen this subjection and hence these institutions flourish in the militant type. Indeed, the forced cooperation and the physical and intellectual submission that is maintained in the militant type have far-reaching and nefarious intellectual consequences. The militant society has subjects that are exposed to "the conspicuous and perpetual experience of personal agency which the militant régime yields".
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This constant experience of personal agency in the form of a despotic sovereign makes persons susceptible to a concept of causality that is personal as well; i.e., cause and effect are associated with individual agencies, whether human or divine or, as frequently happened, a mixture of the two. The idea of impersonal (natural or scientific) causation is utterly alien to these persons, and this reinforces the fit between the militant society and its citizens even more. 43 All these phenomena lead to the conclusion that in the evolution of societies war first makes a paradoxically positive contribution, while at a later stage the paradox is defused by the increasingly dysfunctional contribution of warfare:
From war has been gained all that it had to give. The peopling of the Earth by the more powerful and intelligent race, is a benefit in great measure achieved; and what remains to be done, calls for no other agency than the quiet pressure of a spreading industrial civilization on a barbarism that slowly dwindles.
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In system-theoretical terms this is the inevitable moment when a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop is corrected by a self-correcting negative feedback loop. At this stage further development depends on the cessation of military activities and on a dismantling of the ossified structures of the militant type. And this, according to Spencer, is indeed what has happened in the evolution of human societies. In spite of their rigid character, the old structures of the militant type lose ground, and "While the benefits achieved during the predatory period remain a permanent inheritance, the evils entailed by it will decrease and slowly die out." 45 Where the positive influence of the strong paradox remains open-ended for Morris, this is firmly terminated by Spencer.
With the relative decline of the militant type, a new social form, called "the industrial type" unfolds itself. This change has ramifications across the whole range of a society. As the grip of the militant type on a society loosens, the personal rights and liberties of its citizens increase. 46 The importance of consultative bodies with their clearly military origin declines, while the weight of representative structures that represent the power of the citizens increases. 47 The ownership of land, which in the militant type had become concentrated in the hands of a single ruler or his vassals, becomes communal property and eventually the individual property of citizens in the industrial type. 48 Although Spencer presents the outline of a process that is of a gradual nature, the militant type and the industrial type are juxtaposed with the absolute contrariety of two conceptual prototypes, or "ideal forms". 49 The contrast is expressed in antagonistic terms of destruction and peaceful labour; forced and voluntary cooperation; and aggressive egoism as an intrinsic element of the militant type and egoism that is merely "extrinsic" in industrial life. 50 A transition between these very different types is only possible as long as the functions and structures of the militant type have not become completely ossified and have retained a minimum of plasticity. 51 Societies which lack this plasticity will simply disappear, "if not by violence, then by a decline consequent on inability to compete with younger and more modifiable societies". 52 Even in the parts of Spencer's Principles of Sociology that deal with the peaceful industrial type, however, war retains a looming presence; a society can only concentrate on peaceful activities as long as it is not dragged into military pursuits. 53 Spencer observes that "thus far no civilized or semi-civilized nation has fallen into circumstances making needless all social structures for resisting aggression [ … ]". 54 Hence it is not surprising that the industrial type is less clearly defined than the militant type. The industrial type "has its trait so hidden by those of the stilldominant [militant] type, that its nature is nowhere more than very partially exemplified". 55 Dissolution of the older type and evolution of the newer type prompt Spencer to observe a "mingling of changes" and in his Appendix A to the First Principles he predicts that this "jumbling" of the different regulative systems of the militant and the industrial type will continue in the future. 56 The evolution of societies from the militant to the industrial type implies a general notion of progress. Spencer was inspired in his thinking about the concept of progress by Karl Ernst von Baer's (1792-1876) principle, according to which each organism develops from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity. 57 In his First Principles Spencer widened the scope and refined the content of this principle.
Firstly, he widened its scope by using it as the model for his whole system of universal progress that included astronomical, physical, biological and social systems. 58 While he had at first used the word "evolution" specifically to describe the growth of the embryo, he later used evolution for development on all these levels. Evolution defined in these general terms was governed on all levels by the same principle of the conservation of energy, or the "persistence of force". 59 His ambition to apply the same general and uniform principles to different levels prompted his use and development of system-theoretical concepts that can indeed be fruitfully applied to entities of a wildly varying nature. 60 Secondly, Spencer refined von Baers's principle through the development of his notion of evolution itself; "Evolution is an integration and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." 61 The resulting breathtakingly universal perspective was already illustrated by countless examples from all the systemic levels in the First Principles itself, before it would be even further elaborated in the subsequent works. For example, the idea that the motion of a system tends to increasing integration and differentiation is illustrated with the example of "the advance from the independent fighting of separate warriors to the combined fighting of regiments" that are given specialist functions. 62 So, the general context for Spencer's thinking about social progress and the transition from the militant to the industrial type of society is already firmly established in the First Principles. In the Principles of Sociology his progressive outlook would take him beyond the industrial type, with a speculation about a type of society that is devoted to "higher activities". While in the militant type the individual existed for the benefit of the state, and while in the industrial type the state existed for the benefit of the individual, ultimately life would no longer be for work, but rather work would be for life. 63 Spencer hoped that in the collaboration of the Concert of Europe he could detect an "end to the re-barbarization which is continually undoing civilization". 64 His use of the word "re-barbarization" indicates that progress from the militant to the industrial type is by no means a linear process. Although the "persistence of force" tends to result in progress on all the systemic levels in the long term, there is scope for partial regressions. 65 These regressions can be short and sharp but given the majestic framework of Spencer's universal system, the duration of these regressions can also be rather long and their impact rather deep. In his Principles of Sociology he uses various contemporary and historical examples to make the general sociological point -"that revived belligerent habits re-develop the militant type of structure […]". 66 For instance, he notes that twice in its history the early modern Dutch Republic, which had advanced in the direction of the industrial type as no nation before, relapsed to a monarchy (he means the regime of the Stadtholder) under the sharp "reactive influence of war" in 1672 and 1747.
67 Britain provides Spencer with instances of longer-term fluctuations. In the period of the American War of Independence and the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1775-1815), England regressed towards a society with reduced personal freedom; the peaceful period of 1815-1850 saw the country taking large strides towards the industrial type with "a great liberalization of political arrangements"; and in the period after 1850, i.e., Spencer's own time, he notes again a return towards the militant type, and the extension of centralized administration and compulsory regulation that tends to develop in its wake. 68 In the Third Edition of the Principles of Sociology (1898) he notes that the possession of foreign colonies and the implementation of "coercive legislation affecting men's lives" have increased steeply.
69 Although England's regression towards the militant type may have been a defensive reaction against France and the unified German Empire, "with growth of armaments has gone growth of aggressiveness". 70 This is in line with his repeated general observation that structures can assume (aggressive) functions that are different from the (defensive) functions that prompted their evolution in the first place.
The phenomenon of regression from the industrial to the militant type is merely the manifestation on a social level of the general phenomenon of fluctuation and equilibrium that can be found on all the levels of the Spencerian system. In the First Principles he observes that when a finger draws the prong of a tuning-fork out of its state of equilibrium and then liberates the prong, the force exerted by the finger does not disappear, but persists: "As much force as the finger exerts, so much opposing force arises among the cohering particles. Hence, when the prong is liberated, it is urged back by a force equal to that used in deflecting it" (minus the effect of giving motion to the air and transformation into heat). 71 In this way, "the rhythm of motion" expresses the persistence of force. Moreover, the image of the decreasing amplitude of the prong suggests how fluctuation can be followed by renewed equilibrium. This rhythm is also present on the social level, and on this level war is amongst the first phenomena mentioned by Spencer: "War, exhaustion, recoil -peace, prosperity, and renewed aggression: -see here the alternation as occurring among both savage and civilized peoples." 72 In the Principles of Sociology this rhythm receives more detailed treatment in terms of alternations between the military and the industrial type; and where the centralized political power characteristic of the militant type generates pressures for decentralization, the decentralized power that marks the industrial type creates pressures for centralization. 73 But although this provides us with an explanation for the relatively short-term oscillations between the militant and the industrial type in a long-term progressive framework, we still have not analysed the evolutionary mechanisms that Spencer uses to explain these movements. What is the nature of these causal mechanisms in general, and is there a difference between the mechanisms behind the evolution of militant functions and structures and the evolution of industrial functions and structures?
Biological evolution: two mechanisms
Spencer's fundamental distinction between a militant and an industrial type of society was not new. We have seen that this distinction had already been developed by Saint-Simon and Comte. What made Spencer's sociology so important was his fusion between an evolutionary and a system-theoretical perspective. This perspective put him in a position to compare the evolution of different kinds of systems on completely different levels. Trying to understand social systems, he observes that these systems have certain characteristics in common with organic systems that are not shared with inorganic systems such as for instance the solar system. In both organic and the social systems, evolution pertains to functions and structures, as he had already explained in his First Principles. 74 Both kinds of systems are marked by a progressive increase, differentiation, and mutual interrelation of their functions and structures, in a way that cannot be observed in inorganic aggregates. 75 In addition, the functions of organisms and societies are continued in spite of the death of their respective elements, which again does not apply to inorganic nature. 76 Yet Spencer takes care to emphasize that as soon as biology has fulfilled the function of suggesting to him social evolution in terms of functions and structures, it can be taken away, having served as "mere scaffolding". 77 Indeed in his essay "The Social Organism" Spencer stressed some fundamental differences between organisms and societies. 78 In the essay "The Relations of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology" he bitterly complained about his critics unwillingness to appreciate that his analogy only applied to certain traits of organisms and societies. 79 He did not mistake analogy for evidence. 80 With these caveats in mind, we should nevertheless examine Spencer's Principles of Biology (1864-1867) and his analysis of the driving forces of evolution, before we can turn to his discussion of the forces that drive the evolution of society in general and war in particular. We have seen that Spencer had already explained in the First Principles that the universal coexistence of antagonist forces implies the law of rhythm, which in its turn implies both the decomposition of every force into divergent forces and the ultimate establishment of a balance. 81 A system that is thus in balance with its environment is equilibrated or adapted. In the Principles of Biology Spencer stresses that equilibration or adaptation has a direct and an indirect form. Direct equilibration occurs when a new "incident force" in an organism's surroundings directly results in a new equilibrium, by the exercise of new functions by new structures. 82 When these new structures are passed on to the offspring of the organism in question, we have Lamarckian evolution by acquired characteristics. He admits that to prove this transmission is "for several reasons, comparatively difficult". 83 At the same time he thinks it absurd to suppose that functionally acquired modifications should not be transmitted: "It involves a denial of the persistence of force to say that A may be changed into A 1 , and may yet beget offspring exactly like those it would have begotten had it not been changed." 84 But this is not to say that direct equilibration is the only force that drives biological evolution. There is also the possibility of indirect equilibration "by the continual destruction of the individuals that are least capable of maintaining their equilibria in the presence of this new incident force, there must eventually be arrived at an altered type completely in equilibrium". 85 The word eventually indicates that in this case equilibration is not direct, but indirect. Here the process of acquiring adaptive functions and structures is spread out over numerous generations. And this, of course, is Darwinian evolution: "This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr Darwin has called 'natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life'." 86 In the First Principles, published in 1857, Spencer had discussed evolution, before the appearance of Darwin's Origin of Species, in 1859. On the biological level he had tended to favour Lamarckian evolution. By the time he published the Principles of Biology (1864-1867), however, he had reached a stage where he accorded an equal status to both kinds of equilibration. 87 His treatment of the two different kinds of equilibration is remarkably symmetrical. Part III, "The Evolution of Life", contains a chapter called "Direct Equilibration", which is followed immediately by a chapter called "Indirect Equilibration". Moreover, Spencer appreciates that short-term direct equilibration does not rule out long-term indirect equilibration; he observes that the two processes "are in reality simultaneous". 88 Actually, this fits Darwin's own position, who had always remained prepared to admit that, in addition to modification through natural selection, other mechanisms might exist, including Lamarckian use-inheritance. 89 John Offer remarks that only a decade after Darwin's death in 1882, empirical advances would configure "variations" in genetic terms, discrediting Lamarckian use-heritance. 90 This delay in the rejection of direct equilibration may have offered a conceptual window to Spencer for his even-handed treatment of direct and indirect equilibration. 91 Spencer's balanced treatment of two different kinds of equilibration not only puts his phrase "survival of the fittest" into a wider perspective, but also raises the question of his criterion for preferring one kind of equilibration over the other when he tries to explain the individual phenomena of biological evolution. Firstly, as long as the functions and structures of organisms were comparatively simple and passive, they had few possibilities for coordinating their actions and adjusting directly to their environments, so that indirect equilibration was relatively important: "But along with the gradual evolution of organisms having some activity, there grows up a kind of equilibration that is relatively direct. In proportion as the activity increases, direct equilibration plays a more important part." 92 Secondly, direct equilibration takes place under the continuous short-term effects of external factors on the individual organisms of a biological species. If, however, external changes are so swift and dramatic as to be fatal to the individual organism in question, then equilibration will take place on a longer term and not on the level of the individual organism, but on the level of the entire species. 93 So, depending on the circumstances, sometimes direct equilibration and sometimes indirect equilibration is Spencer's preferred explanatory mechanism for biological evolution. Active systems are more susceptible to direct than to indirect equilibration and abrupt changes tend to favour indirect over direct equilibration. Let us now investigate the relevance of these criteria for social evolution.
Evolution of the militant and the industrial type: two mechanisms
Spencer makes little use of the terms equilibration or adaptation in the Principles of Sociology, yet the biological concepts of direct and indirect equilibration are clearly present and they have a clear relevance for the social evolution of the militant and the industrial type. Most obviously, and also most notoriously, Spencer notes that the indirect equilibration brought about by the Darwinian struggle for life has a special relevance for the militant type of society. Natural selection and survival of the fittest are not only biological but also social phenomena. Only societies with the most efficient forms of military cooperation will survive; and Spencer typically notes that this is in accordance with "the laws of evolution at large". 94 Between tribal groups who vary in the degree to which they are prepared to retaliate when their members are killed, there will tend to be "a survival of the unforgiving". 95 During the relentless struggle for survival among societies, the militant type will be favoured: "The social type produced by survival of the fittest, will be one in which the fighting part includes all who can bear arms and be trusted with arms, while the remaining part serves simply as a permanent commissariat." 96 These various applications of biological indirect equilibration to social indirect equilibration, and the supposedly positive evaluation of (military) conflict, have earned Spencer the rather infamous sobriquet of "social Darwinist". The actual picture was more complicated. Firstly, we have already seen that he was actually a pacifist whose positive evaluation of war as the earliest form of human cooperation and hence of human civilization was formulated with an obvious reluctance. Secondly, the indirect equilibration implied by his "social Darwinism" is not limited to physical aggression, and continues long after the militant type of society has been superseded by the industrial type, although Spencer does not elaborate on the precise form of the resulting bloodless struggle: when, the struggle for existence between societies by war having ceased, there remains only the industrial struggle for existence, the final survival and spread must be on the part of those societies which produce the largest number of the best individuals -individuals best adapted for life in the industrial state. 97 Thirdly, we have already noticed Spencer's point made in the Principles of Biology that as organisms become more complicated and more active, indirect equilibration through Darwinian natural selection is increasingly superseded by direct equilibration through the transmission of acquired characteristics. This process is continued until natural selection within human societies between human individuals is almost completely replaced by direct equilibration through cultural transmission: habits and experiences are accumulated, and the result is passed on indefinitely from one generation to another. 98 This still leaves open the possibility of struggle between societies, but (see the previous point) competition between societies of the industrial type will tend to have an increasingly non-military character.
Although indirect equilibration remains a force to be reckoned with, not only on the biological but also on the social level, direct equilibration on the social level is an increasingly important mechanism in the course of human evolution. It is also a mechanism that is easy to understand; it consists of cultural transmission. But while the mechanism of direct equilibration on the social level is very clear, we have already noted (in Section 4) Spencer's admission that the mechanism of direct equilibration on the biological level is very obscure. Hence it is not surprising that in this case Spencer sees the paradigmatic potential of sociology for biology. In the Principles of Biology he notes that "From the law of adaptive modification in societies, we may therefore hope to get a clue to the laws of adaptive modification in organisms." 99 In the later essay "The Relations of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology" Spencer would indeed repeat the importance of a reciprocal influence of biology and sociology when he defended himself against one-sided interpretations of "the parallelism I have asserted between certain traits of individual organisms and certain traits of social organisms". 100 Actually, rather than exploiting biology for sociology, or vice versa, Spencer was primarily interested in using the contributions of both disciplines for his overarching universal system. 101 It has been noted that Spencer discussed Darwinian struggle in the context of his social theory "in a somewhat chastened Lamarckian form", which might suggest a certain confusion; but although his use of the two evolutionary mechanisms to explain the phenomenon of war was rich and subtle, it was not diffuse. 102 He used the two different concepts of evolution in a distinct way in order to analyse the differences between the militant and the industrial type. The needs of warfare stimulated social cooperation, and cooperation started an evolutionary process of direct equilibration in which increasingly complicated functions and structures responded to increasingly complicated environmental needs in a process of cultural transmission. Given the primacy of military needs, it is not strange that the militant type of society evolved first. This militant type initially created a civilized space that enabled the gradual evolution of the industrial type; then hindered the further evolution of this industrial type; and finally will be overcome by the industrial type. And during this entire process of direct equilibration there are rhythmic disruptions in the form of military disasters during which the fittest societies survive in a decreasingly bloody process of indirect equilibration. This picture of gradual direct equilibration of military institutions and cataclysmic indirect equilibration of entire societies fits Spencer's use of his criterion for either direct or indirect equilibration on the biological level as explained at the end of the previous section. This is the nature of his "parallelism" between biological and social functions and structures.
The function of the militant/industrial typology Although Spencer's progressive view of the peaceful social and economic evolution through direct equilibration away from the military type towards the industrial type allows for dramatic regressions as part of a process of indirect equilibration, and although societies actually consist of mixtures that have characteristics of both types, we have already seen that the two social types themselves remain utterly antagonistic. This rigid conceptual antagonism perhaps shows itself most strikingly in Spencer's disparaging remarks about the possibility of a positive technological spin-off from military innovations. He agrees that the phenomenon has existed and admits that it still exists, but accords it a rather dismal future. He believes that technological innovation has contributed towards a development away from the militant type towards the industrial type; and in proportion as peace beats war, the importance of military technological spin-off will dwindle:
And though from the early days when flint arrow-heads were chipped and clubs carved, down to present days when armour-plates a foot thick are rolled, the needs of defense and offence have urged on invention and mechanical skill; yet in our own generation steam-hammers, hydraulic rams, and multitudinous new appliances from locomotive to telephones, prove that industrial needs alone have come to furnish abundant pressure whereby, hereafter, the industrial arts will be further advanced. 103 So, military spin-off becomes an ever rarer phenomenon. Moreover, even where military spin-off still occurs or has occurred, Spencer stresses that "the destroying activities have been antagonistic to the productive activities", and he believes that destruction has overshadowed production. 104 As an example he gives medieval France where chronic warfare between the fifth and the tenth centuries repeatedly broke up industrial organization. In this way, by robbing the militant type of merit after its initial functionality, he maintains its antagonism with the industrial type. But why, actually, is he so keen to maintain this antagonism? What is the function of this antagonism?
For Spencer the state of peace associated with the industrial type is very much a function of his political liberalism. This liberalism informs his comparison between the functionality of organic and social systems. In both cases the systems acquire specialized "seats of feeling" that process information and regulate the system in question. This development of centralized structures has been more limited in the cases of societies then in the case of organisms. Societies do not have the same physical cohesion between their parts as organisms; they do not consist of separate organs, but of separate people. Whereas in organisms consciousness is concentrated, it is diffused in societies. There is no "social sensorium"; each individual has its own sensorium. Spencer concludes that whereas the organs of an organism exist for the sake of that organism, a society exists for the sake of its members, not the other way around -and this observation forms the basis for his liberalism. 105 In a liberal and peaceful organization, coercive structures whose function had been the protection against other societies, fade away; but the structures needed to provide individuals protection against each other will remain in existence. 106 Spencer notes that in his own time, however, the industrial type and its concomitant liberalism are still accompanied everywhere by various admixtures of the militant type, with the ever-present danger of regressions away from the former type towards the latter type. And while the natural political principle of the industrial type is liberalism, that of the militant type is socialism or communism. Some socialists "though probably not many", actually realize that their ideal modes of living have already prevailed in the earliest societies, "as well as among some of the civilized who have lagged behind". A militant society rests on forced cooperation; this tends to place "a premium on idleness" and fits a socialist mode of production. 107 The burdening of "the better" for the benefit of "the worse" must check the evolution of a higher and more adapted nature: the ultimate result being that a community by which this policy is pursued, will, other things being equal, fail in competition with a community which pursues the purely equitable policy, and will eventual disappear in the race of civilization.
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In the long run this combination of militarism and socialism is doomed. Societies of this type will gradually fall behind in terms of direct equilibration, or collapse suddenly "like a house of cards" as the result of indirect equilibration, for instance in the case "of the ancient Peruvians before a handful of Spaniards" -the society of the Incas being very militant and very socialist. 109 Spencer argues that more recent and even contemporary regressions from the industrial to the militant type have again been accompanied by regressions from liberalism to socialism. 110 He sees 1850 as the start of a period of heightened international military tension and tirelessly points out examples of a concomitant extension of centralized administration and compulsory regulation in Britain and elsewhere. He considers laws against contagious diseases, social legislation against poverty, social housing projects, the distribution of gas and water, and nationalized railways as equally nefarious examples of militant regressions:
Instead of extending the principle proper to the industrial type, of providing quick and costless remedies for injuries, minor as well as major, which citizens inflict on one another, legislators extend the principle of preventing them by inspections. The arrangements in mines, factories, ships, lodging houses, bakehouses, down even to water-closets in private dwellings, are prescribed by laws carried out by officials.
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The ultimate horror perhaps, for Spencer, is the use of public funds for public libraries whose quality is then inspected by authorities who are again financed with public funds. In each of these cases we see self-reinforcing mechanisms at work; compulsory charity stimulates "improvidence" which in its turn stimulates even more compulsory charity. The clearest examples of a resurgent militarism and socialism, however, are not detected in Britain, but in France and, even more, Germany. In these countries strong military traditions have been matched by loud claims for various forms of state interventions by their social reformers. 112 And in Germany these demands were graciously met in 1882 by "Prince Bismarck's scheme of State-socialism". 113 In his intellectual biography of Spencer, Mark Francis has argued that Spencer's anti-socialism was not primarily the product of a laissez-faire liberalism. Spencer's liberalism in the early Social Statics (1851) was centred on peace and altruism, and he was not averse from an active role of the state in order to realize justice and equity, including the nationalization of land, since humanity should not be degraded by begging the lords of the soil for "room for the soles of their feet". 114 This brand of liberalism would still inform the later essays in The Man versus The State (1884), which, moreover, teaches us more about the sources of Spencer's anti-socialism. 115 Francis observes that for Spencer this was merely "a subset of his hostility to democratic politics; he believed that the working class would attempt to legislate advantages for themselves just as the upper classed had done". 116 Spenser saw democracy in general and socialism in particular as yet another revival of a political theory that would obstruct "remedies for injuries" and hinder the development of justice and peace. Socialism should hence be considered as an antiliberal impediment to progress. 117 So, Spencer's rigid sociological distinction between the industrial and the militant type is deeply connected with his liberal and anti-militarist sympathies. The exclusive connection of war and socialism with the militant type and the equally exclusive connection of peace and liberalism with the industrial type keep them clearly apart and increase their functionality. The growth away from the militant type and towards the industrial type means that war, after its initial function in establishing human society, becomes increasingly dysfunctional. In that sense Spencer's model can be regarded as an alternative to forms of the strong paradox of war as espoused by Morris, in whose views "productive" warfare tends to remain functional -and hence paradoxical -throughout human history. In Spencer's model the strong paradox of war ultimately evaporates during the evolution from the militant to the industrial type. There is, however, a price for this solution, and this price has again the form of a paradox.
We have already seen how Spencer attaches precious little value to industrial development in the form of military spin-off. In addition, it could be said that he is equally unappreciative of military development in the form of industrial spin-off; i.e., he does not show much interest in the possibility that the fruits of industrialization could be used as a means towards the accomplishments of military aims -which would place industry back again in the instrumental role that it had so clearly in Saint-Simon's feudal system or Spencer's militant type. The intensification of warfare by industrial means would indeed show itself as a gruesomely clear possibility shortly after Spencer's death, with the outbreak of the First World War. In that way, every element of progress away from the militant to the industrial type provides the potential for equally strong regressions back to the militant type. This could be called the industrial-militant paradox; economic progress has the potential of increasing rather than decreasing the amplitude of Spencer's regressions from the industrial to the militant type. It is not surprising that he did not appreciate the industrial-militant paradox, given its lethal ramifications for his model of social evolution. Yet the potential of the industrial-militant paradox in Spencer's work gains force in the same measure as the strong paradox evaporates. The industrial-militant paradox seems to have been within his grasp at least two times. Firstly, we have seen him observing the power of modern "steamhammers [and] hydraulic rams" and their application for the production of "armour-plates a foot thick" without taking the step suggested here. Secondly, since he formulated an explicit relation between strong militarization and ultimate military weakness in the case of the Inca Empire, it is remarkable that he did not formulate a similar relation between strong industrialization and ultimate military strength. The process of industrialization was an ambiguous phenomenon; for Comte and Spencer it promised a pacific union of mankind, while for such different thinkers as Marx and Nietzsche its lethal weapons were unleashing an era of mass warfare. 118 
Evaluation
Spencer's lack of appreciation of the industrial-militant paradox may betray a certain awkwardness in the face of modern technological developments in his stunningly comprehensive evolution of everything -or as Fabrizio Battistelli put it:
In its attempt to demonstrate the continuity of the process of evolution, from the Protozoa to the City of London, this approach is much more at home with the functions and structures of social aggregation in its simplest forms, than with those belonging to societies with a considerable level of historicity. 119 Yet here Battistelli seems to miss the novelty of Spencer. He was not the first to use a stadial model of history in which warfare is given an initial but transitory function of war; we have seen this in Ferguson, Saint-Simon and Comte. Nevertheless, he was the first to introduce a functional-structural understanding of warfare, as part of his two theories of evolution, in the framework of a general systems theory. This framework allowed for a naturalistic analysis of war that is neither vitalistic nor completely reductive. Spencer's approach is naturalistic because he believes that rules of behaviour cannot be deliberately designed; they are the natural product of social life which have evolved gradually. 120 His approach is anti-vitalistic because of his belief that organisms and societies employ the same physical forces as inorganic nature -only when the organic level has thus been robbed of its uniqueness is it applied to the social level; this allows Spencer to posit the same Force on all system-theoretical levels. 121 Finally, his approach is not completely reductive because it leaves room for what can be called a complex systems model of teleology, in the sense that both biological and social feedback systems can be described in terms of a goal-directedness whose aim is the survival or propagation of the system. 122 Although Spencer's evolutionary perspective has been the object of trenchant criticism, there is an appreciation that "there are very few ideas employed within the mainstream of [modern] evolutionary sociology which cannot be traced back to his writings". 123 Compared to that of his predecessors, Spencer's system-theoretical and evolutionary analysis of war is original, and looking forward to his successors in the contemporary field of big history, his contribution remains surprisingly relevant. Historians such as Cynthia Stokes Brown, David Christian and Fred Spier are all using the largest possible canvas for their analysis of the past, and their multi-level accounts are frequently inspired by system-theoretical and evolutionary concepts. 124 Since aggression, struggle and war seem such universal phenomena, it is not surprising that some of the finest specimens of big history can be found in military history, in the works of William McNeill, Azar Gat and Ian Morris. 125 The early contribution of Spencer's sociology to this field can best be understood in terms of a distinction made by Auguste Comte: that of a statique sociale whose objects are laws and the taxonomy of institutions, and that of a dynamique sociale that is interested in their evolution. 126 Thanks to Spencer's interest in the historical dynamics of the militant/industrial typology he was able to make his precocious contribution to big history -a contribution that is overlooked by most modern big historians. 127 Spencer was not interested in "the gossip of history" but in a "general law in the evolution of societies". 128 His belief that societies are not constructed by designs and intentions but are the result of gradual natural processes, was motivated by a liberal distrust of "social schemers" and politicians who passed acts "to amend acts that were before amended". 129 It is within this general historical and ideological framework that Spencer first posits and then dissolves the strong paradox of war.
